Perspectives on Global and Regional Security  and Implications of Nuclear and Space  Technologies: U.S.-Brazil Strategic Dialogue, Phase II Report by Clunan, Anne L. & Tulkoff, Judith
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Center on Contemporary Conflict CCC PASCC Reports
2014-10
Perspectives on Global and Regional
Security  and Implications of Nuclear
and Space  Technologies: U.S.-Brazil
Strategic Dialogue, Phase II Report
Clunan, Anne L.
Monterey, California:  Naval Postgraduate School.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43786
Perspectives on Global and 
Regional Security and  
Implications for Nuclear 
and Space Technologies
U.S.-Brazil Strategic Dialogue 
Phase II Report
Dr. Anne Clunan 
Naval Postgraduate School
with Ms. Judith Tulkoff 
Naval Postgraduate School
OCTOBER 2014  |  REPORT NUMBER 2014-009
	  Perspectives on Global and Regional Security 
and Implications of Nuclear and Space 
Technologies: 
U.S.-Brazil Strategic Dialogue, Phase II Report 	   Anne	  L.	  Clunan,	  Ph.D.	  
Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  	  with	  	  Judith	  Tulkoff	  
Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  
	  
	  
October	  2014	   	  	  This	  report	  is	  the	  product	  of	  collaboration	  between	  the	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  and	  the 	  Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency.	  	  	  The	  views	  expressed	  herein	  are	  those	  of	  the	  authors	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  the	  official	  policy	  or	  position	  of	   the	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School,	  the	  Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency,	   the	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  or	   the 	  United	  States	  Government.	  
	  
	   This	  report	  is	  approved	  for	  public	  release;	  distribution	  is	  unlimited.	  	  
	  
U.S.	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  
Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  
Project	  on	  Advanced	  Systems	  and	  Concepts	  for	  	  
Countering	  WMD	  	   PASCC	  Report	  Number:	  2014	  009	  	  	  	   	  
	   ii	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  (CCC)	  is	  the	  research	  wing	  of	   the	   Department	   of	   National	   Security	   Affairs	   (NSA)	   and	   specializes	   in	   the	   study	   of	  international	   relations,	   security	  policy,	   and	  regional	   studies.	  One	  of	   the	  CCC’s	  programs	   is	  the	  Project	  Advanced	  Systems	  and	  Concepts	  for	  Countering	  WMD	  (PASCC).	  PASCC	  operates	  as	   a	   program	   planning	   and	   implementation	   office,	   research	   center,	   and	   intellectual	  clearinghouse	   for	   the	   execution	   of	   analysis	   and	   future-­‐oriented	   studies	   and	   dialogues	   for	  the	  Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency.	  	   	  	  	  For	  further	  information,	  please	  contact:	  
The	  Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  1411	  Cunningham	  Road	  Monterey,	  CA	  93943	  pascc@nps.edu	   	  
	   iii	  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 	  
EXECUTIVE	  SUMMARY	  ........................................................................................................................	  IV	  
KEY	  FINDINGS	  ........................................................................................................................................	  IV	  
INTRODUCTION	  ......................................................................................................................................	  1	  
CHALLENGES	  IN	  THE	  U.S.-­‐BRAZIL	  RELATIONSHIP	  ......................................................................	  4	  
1.	  NATIONAL	  INTERESTS	  IN	  GLOBAL	  SECURITY	  ..........................................................................	  7	  
2.	  NATIONAL	  PERSPECTIVES	  ON	  REGIONAL	  SECURITY	  ..........................................................	  11	  
3.	  DOMESTIC	  POLITICAL	  INTERESTS	  AND	  STRATEGIC	  TECHNOLOGIES	  ..........................	  14	  
4.	  NUCLEAR	  TECHNOLOGIES	  AND	  NONPROLIFERATION	  .......................................................	  17	  
5.	  THE	  UNITED	  NATIONS,	  IAEA,	  AND	  SAFEGUARDS	  .................................................................	  20	  
6.	  SPACE	  AND	  MISSILE	  TECHNOLOGIES	  .......................................................................................	  25	  
7.	  DEEPENING	  U.S.-­‐BRAZILIAN	  AND	  CIVIL	  SOCIETY	  ENGAGEMENT	  ...................................	  28	  
LIST	  OF	  ACRONYMS	  ............................................................................................................................	  32	  
 
  
	   iv	  
Executive Summary 
In August 2014, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center on Contemporary Conflict hosted 
an off-the-record dialogue between U.S. and Brazilian officials and experts on the role of 
strategic technologies in each country’s perceptions of global and regional security. 
Following from the 2012 PASCC-sponsored U.S.-Brazil dialogue, this meeting expanded the 
scope of discussion beyond nuclear weapons and disarmament to examine factors affecting 
mutual perceptions of nuclear, space, and missile technologies. The dialogue aimed to 
increase mutual understanding of: 1) the ways these advanced technologies are perceived, 
developed and managed in the United States and Brazil; 2) the regional and global security 
threats that arise from these capabilities; and 3) the means for cooperation on managing the 
negative implications of these technologies, both at the inter-governmental and civil-society 
level. The meeting brought together active and former high-level defense officials with 
academic experts to address these issues. The meeting produced an exceptionally rich, open, 
friendly and frank discussion that succeeded in increasing understanding of each side’s 
strategic concerns and identified some practical steps for bilateral cooperation. 
Key Findings 
The central challenge in the relationship is distrust among policymakers, based on perceived 
hypocrisy regarding each other’s stated commitments to international rules and norms and 
actions that appear to undermine or ignore them. In Brazil, elite perceptions of hypocrisy are 
underpinned by a general societal mistrust regarding U.S. motives, based on Cold-War 
dispositions to favor those opposing U.S. intervention and hegemony in Latin America. In 
the United States, on the other hand, Brazil is far less visible in the policy community and 
broader society as an important actor in the Western hemisphere or globally. On nuclear 
nonproliferation and disarmament, U.S. participants viewed as hypocritical the Brazilian 
refusal, despite Brazil being a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), to adhere to the 
Additional Protocol of the global NPT. Brazil instead prefers a bilateral arrangement with 
Argentina. U.S. participants also found Brazilian claims to support the principles of 
nonintervention, human rights and democracy to be contradicted by their government’s 
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silence on external interventions in Ukraine, Syria, Honduras, Libya and elsewhere. 
Brazilians, for their part, viewed as hypocritical the U.S. support for a voluntary code of 
conduct for outer space, rather than a legally binding treaty to ban the use of weapons in 
outer space, as well as U.S. support of nuclear side-deals with new nuclear states, such as 
India. Brazilian participants generally viewed the U.S. government as only selectively 
adhering to international agreements and rules. They placed a priority on nonintervention 
over human rights and democracy. 
In addition, the two sides have different worldviews with respect to security and foreign 
policy issues, a set of domestic bureaucratic and structural issues that impede relations, and a 
general lack of domestic expertise and awareness of the other party. Brazil has a defensive 
posture, focused on dissuasion and regional stability, while the United States has long had a 
forward, and genuinely global orientation to international security. For the United States, 
nonstate actors are increasingly viewed as central threat to international peace and security, 
while for Brazil, the focus remains on states. Brazilian foreign and defense policy is driven 
largely by its belief in egalitarian sovereignty and the principle of autonomy in foreign and 
domestic policy. The United States, in contrast, views itself in a global role of containing 
threats to stability. Despite its regional orientation in foreign and defense policy, Brazil 
desires to be global player. Domestically, participants discussed the political environment 
that impeded Brazilian ratification of bilateral agreements and U.S. pursuit of multilateral 
treaties. Scandals, such as the Snowden revelations of NSA surveillance of the Brazilian 
President’s communications, significantly heightened Brazilian distrust. Bureaucratic and 
political interests in both countries have preserved defense weapons programs, including the 
Brazilian nuclear-powered attack submarine and the U.S. F-35 fighter, despite the lack of a 
clear military or cost-benefit rationale for them. Brazilian participants emphasized the 
relative youth of their foreign and defense institutions, noting that the Ministry of Defense 
and civilian unified command of the branches of armed forces are merely fifteen years old. 
Both sides acknowledged the fundamental lack of awareness of the other country, 
compounded by the dearth of Brazil scholars in the United States and of U.S., international 
relations, and security experts in Brazil. 
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Regarding the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, it became clear that national 
exceptionalism and the two countries’ different views regarding non-state actors shape both 
countries’ views of the effectiveness of the regime and its implementation. Despite 
disagreement regarding the efficacy of the NPT, both sides did agree that new safeguard 
arrangements are necessary given changing technologies. Brazilian participants view the NPT 
as fundamentally flawed, as it enshrines a nuclear hierarchy that is at odds with Brazil’s 
adherence to egalitarian sovereignty. As a result, Brazil opposes ratification of the Additional 
Protocol of the NPT until the nuclear weapons states (NWS) make progress towards 
disarmament. Brazilian participants view ABACC as a better instrument than the NPT. U.S. 
participants noted that progress on disarmament has been hampered not by the United 
States, but by other NWS, and that Brazil’s preference for ABACC contradicted its stated 
commitment to global governance. U.S. and Brazilian experts agreed that technologies to 
improve nuclear safeguards were evolving and that a productive dialogue could be 
undertaken to ascertain how to improve on the existing ABACC and IAEA safeguards. 
Brazil’s nuclear submarine program produced considerable debate among the Brazilian 
participants. Brazilian scholars challenged Brazilian officials to provide a more compelling 
argument for the program, saying it lacked a sound rationale and a transparent cost-benefit 
assessment. The nuclear submarine program and Brazil’s stated desire to master the nuclear 
fuel cycle also produced discussions about U.S. concerns regarding nuclear latency and 
proliferation to nonstate actors. Brazilian participants argued that Brazil should not be 
placed in the same category as other countries capable of “breaking out” of non-nuclear 
weapons status, given Brazil’s hundred years of peace with its neighbors and its 
constitutional prohibition on non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Brazilian participants 
rejected the U.S. penchant for creating such categories. Ultimately, the discussion over 
nuclear submarines did not clarify the strategic rationale for the program, other than to 
suggest that prestige might be a central factor in Brazil’s calculations.  
There is improved potential for productive collaboration in space, according to U.S. and 
Brazilian experts. Brazil-U.S. cooperation on space issues dates back to the 1950s. Changes 
in U.S. space policy towards an emphasis on multilateral cooperation bring the United States 
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closer to Brazil’s preferred position. Prospects for commercial collaboration are good, 
existing military-to-military contacts continue, and there may be opportunities to resume 
U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on the International Space Station. U.S. experts noted, however, 
that Brazil would need to make choices regarding its preferred space partners. The U.S. 
opposes the draft treaty on banning weapons in space, as it lacks prohibitions on anti-
satellite testing and means for verification. Brazil on the other hand, prefers this Russian-
Chinese initiated treaty, as it desires to have legally binding instruments rather than the 
European Union’s voluntary Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities. Possibilities for 
cooperation in the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Space (UNCOPUOS) are perhaps 
brightest.  
Participants concluded with a discussion of how to build a community of experts versed in 
U.S.-Brazilian relations and security issues. A number of structural and cultural impediments 
have yielded a tiny group of people in both countries who are knowledgeable on these 
topics. Few Americans know Portuguese or have motivations to learn it, while few Brazilians 
know English or have studied in the United States, and even fewer have an interest or 
expertise in security issues. Brazil has only in the past fifteen years begun to develop 
international relations curricula at universities and to establish think tanks devoted to foreign 
policy and security issues. In the United States, Brazil is not the object of separate study in 
the way that China or Russia is, but is generally viewed as part of Latin America, rather than 
in its own right. Participants suggested that increased investment in scholarly exchanges 
would be very beneficial, as well as expanded interaction between civil society actors in both 
countries. Participants stressed the continued need for bilateral dialogue on security issues, 
such as the present one, and offered a number of suggestions for constructive engagement 
on nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation and disarmament.  
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Introduction 
In August 2014, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center on Contemporary Conflict hosted 
an off-the-record dialogue between U.S. and Brazilian officials and experts on the role of 
strategic technologies in each country’s perceptions of global and regional security. 
Following from the 2012 U.S.-Brazil dialogue, this meeting expanded the scope of discussion 
beyond nuclear weapons and disarmament to examine factors affecting mutual perceptions 
of nuclear, space, and missile technologies. The dialogue aimed to increase mutual 
understanding of: 1) the ways these advanced technologies are perceived, developed and 
managed in the United States and Brazil; 2) the regional and global security threats that arise 
from these capabilities; and 3) the means for cooperation on managing the negative 
implications of these technologies, both at the inter-governmental and civil-society level. The 
meeting brought together active and former high-level defense officials with academic 
experts to address these issues. The meeting produced an exceptionally rich, open, friendly 
and frank discussion that succeeded in increasing understanding of each side’s strategic 
concerns and identified some practical steps for bilateral cooperation. 
Brazil’s growing importance as a regional and global leader and its potential contributions to 
global nonproliferation require investigation of what strategic problems Brazilian leaders 
believe they face and how these affect U.S. interests globally and regionally. Brazilian elites 
have considered Brazil to be a significant player on the world scene since the establishment 
of the Republic in 1889.  Despite participating as the only Latin American state in World 
War I and with Mexico in World War II, Brazil has never achieved international stature 
equivalent to its self-image.1  Today it is far closer to major power status than at any time in 
its history.  With the sixth largest economy in the world as of 20122, stable and predictable 
democratic politics that address the needs of the poor without recurring to demagogic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations,” Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, Washington DC, September 28, 2007. 
2 “Brazil ‘overtakes UK’s economy’,” BBC News, 6 March 2012. Accessed on May 28, 2012 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17272716. 
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populist policies, vast energy reserves, and a significant scientific community, Brazil has laid 
the groundwork for achieving major power status.  This explosive development has been 
accompanied by steady investment in defense that will soon provide Brazil with the kinds of 
capabilities needed to influence international affairs using the full spectrum of state power.  
As Brazil’s influence increases, the potential implications for US national defense will only 
intensify. Brazil has the material potential for major power status based on some traditional 
indicators (economic profile, population, natural resources, and size). Based on its existing 
nuclear program, deep-sea oil exploration, and implementation of large-scale remote sensing 
networks in the Amazon (SIVAM), Brazil is clearly capable of implementing state-led 
technology projects, including those associated with technologies useful for WMD. 
Unwilling to depend on others for technologies fundamental to its national defense, Brazil 
requires foreign companies that wish to sell in Brazil to produce in partnership with Brazilian 
companies, thus ensuring transfer of technological know-how.  In a recent example, Brazil’s 
comprehensive arms deal with France requires French contractors to help Brazil build the 
shell of nuclear-powered submarines.3  It is also pursuing significant international 
cooperation on space technologies.4 Through such means and others, Brazil in the future will 
become a significant source of defense-related and dual-use technologies. Such capacity 
makes it important to understand where Brazil’s growing capabilities will lead it with regard 
to international arms control and nonproliferation and the use and control of strategic 
technologies. 
Brazil has the potential to significantly strengthen or undermine international arms control 
and nonproliferation, both as a country with advanced technological capacity and significant 
deposits of uranium and thorium, used in the production of fissile materials. Brazil is one of 
the few countries thought to have mastered much of the nuclear fuel cycle, and it is able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “Brazil’s Submarine Import and Export Behavior,” NTI, April 20, 2011. Accessed on May 
28, 2012, at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/brazil-submarine-import-and-export-
behavior/. 
4 Nicolas Peter, “The changing geopolitics of space activities,” Space Policy 22.2 (May 2006): 
100-109. 
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export advanced nuclear technologies. Although it has voiced support for nuclear restraint 
and disarmament, it is not clear what role Brazil will seek to play with respect to 
nonproliferation. Brazil has collaborated on global non-proliferation issues and joined the 
Missile Technology Control Regime in 1995 and the NPT in 1998. Yet it remains critical of 
the NPT and especially, the Additional Protocol (AP) (which it has refused to sign).5  
It is important that the United States and Brazil continue to build understanding of each 
other’s strategic perspectives to promote a more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic 
relationship and nonproliferation.  This goal has taken on new urgency in the wake of 
President Obama’s commitment in his April 2009 Prague speech to strengthening the global 
nonproliferation regime and moving toward global nuclear disarmament.  The importance of 
strategic dialogues was emphasized in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report.  
Although the U.S.-Brazil relationship has historically been cordial, within the region, Brazil 
has already demonstrated opposition to core U.S. policies, for example, its leadership of the 
regional opposition to the U.S.-Colombian anti-drug trafficking and terrorism partnership.  
Brazil has been critical of U.S. policies on narcotics control, democracy promotion, 
combating terrorism, and the broader U.S. policy in the Western hemisphere. Brazil has 
traditionally viewed the existing international order as unequal and unfair, and it seeks status 
as a permanent member of the UN Security Council through enhanced leverage in South-
South and BRICs groupings. 6 Under President Lula da Silva’s leadership, Brazil sought to 
actively enhance and promote its influence on global affairs, including on negotiations over 
Iran’s nuclear program. Bilateral relations were positive initially under the administration of 
President Dilma Rouseff, only to be frozen in the wake of the Snowden affair. As such, the 
2014 dialogue was an effort to investigate what may help re-launch a positive bilateral 
relationship by discussing some of the key strategic issues between the two countries. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Fred McGoldrick, “Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: 
Issues, Constraints, Options,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard 
Kennedy School, May 2011. 
6 Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State,” 25, 35-36; Joe Leahy and James Lamont, 
“BRICs to Debate Creation of Common Bank,” Financial Times, March 20, 2012. 
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Challenges in the U.S.-Brazil Relationship 
The central challenge in the relationship is distrust among policymakers, based on perceived 
hypocrisy regarding each other’s stated commitments to international rules and norms and 
actions that appear to undermine or ignore them. In Brazil, this is underpinned by a general 
societal mistrust regarding U.S. motives, based on Cold-War dispositions to favor those 
opposing U.S. intervention and hegemony in Latin America. In the United States, on the 
other hand, Brazil is far less visible in the policy community and broader society as an 
important actor in the Western hemisphere or globally. In addition, the two sides have 
different worldviews with respect to security and foreign policy issues, a set of domestic 
bureaucratic and structural issues that impede relations, and a general lack of domestic 
expertise and awareness of the other party. 
The U.S. side views the distrust between the two countries as “counterintuitive,” in the 
words of a former senior Pentagon official, as Brazil and the United States have so much in 
common, such as support for democracy and human rights. President Obama came into 
office with a new vision of relations with Latin America that would not focus on the war on 
drugs or on counter-terrorism. Instead, the United States would focus on international 
institutions. These aspirations gradually foundered as a result of the perception that Brazil 
was uninterested in working with the United States on western hemisphere issues; instead 
Brazil was more interested in creating a sphere of influence in South America and limiting 
U.S. re-engagement of the region. While bilateral relations at the operational and tactical 
levels were moving forward, the U.S. side felt that, at the strategic level, Brazil believed that 
its international leadership had to come at the expense of U.S. leadership. Brazil’s refusal to 
criticize Russia over Syria, for example, generated confusion and distrust. According to a 
former senior U.S. defense official, the very top U.S. national security leaders are concerned 
with a small number of national security issues: managing relations with Russia and China, 
threats posed by North Korea and Iran, and threats posed by terrorist organizations such as 
the Islamic State and its offshoots. Relations between the United States and Brazil generally 
do not fall into these categories, and therefore are handled by regional experts, except when 
they relate to this very short list of security issues. On these issues, the former official stated, 
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“it’s a zero-sum game, if you side with them, you are opposed to us. And that feeds into all 
the bilateral issues that normally would be able to be worked out.” 
Given its adherence to the democracy clause that forms part of the OAS, Mercosur, 
UNASUR charters, the U.S. administration expected Brazil to assume a leadership role in a 
number of hemispheric events, including the constitutional crises in Paraguay and Honduras, 
and countering threats to democracy in Venezuela. Brazil’s inaction left Washington 
“baffled,” according to one former senior defense official. The bilateral relationship, for this 
reason, had become stuck even before the Snowden revelations about U.S. government 
surveillance of Brazilian President Rousseff. The United States and Brazil have created the 
architecture to work through a whole array of technology transfer issues, but these 
agreements are awaiting approval by the Brazilian legislature. This architecture, according to 
the former U.S. Pentagon official, “will open the floodgates for more collaboration,” once it 
is approved on the Brazilian side. However, according to this official, cooperation has 
descended into a vicious cycle of distrust where, because the United States cannot carry 
through on all of the technology transfer, Brazil perceives the United States is not interested 
in Brazil playing a leading role, and the Brazilian congress therefore sees little reason to ratify 
the agreements that would make this technology transfer possible. The U.S. government, in 
turn, perceives that Brazil is not serious about the bilateral relationship.  
From the Brazilian side, participants highlighted three areas of U.S. behavior that 
contributed to distrust: U.S. interventions; the U.S. reaction to Brazil’s negotiations with 
Iran; and the Snowden revelations that the U.S. government was monitoring the Brazilian 
president’s communications. The foundation of Brazilian foreign and defense policy is 
grounded on sovereignty and nonintervention. U.S. commitments to interventions for 
humanitarian reasons, including democracy, are viewed negatively. The U.S. is seen as having 
a penchant for intervention that not only violates international law but worsens the situation 
it was intended to improve. According to a Brazilian participant, “the perception is that the 
U.S. would only use international institutions when it was convenient.” American 
participants countered that the United States is interested in seeing Brazil assume more 
responsibility in shaping the political-security environment, yet they see hypocrisy in Brazil’s 
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position on Russia, as Brazil claims that it supports sovereignty and non-intervention, and 
yet its silence on Ukraine contributes to Russian interventionism.  
While the Brazilian participants highlighted their government’s commitment to international 
rules and norms, they admitted that in many cases, geopolitical calculations were a 
determinant of Brazilian perspectives and policy. A senior defense official stressed that 
Brazilian policymakers have a long memory in this regard, giving the example of the 
perceived U.S. desertion of its Argentine ally during the Falklands/Malvinas war. 
Participants highlighted that when Brazil had assumed a leadership role in negotiations with 
Iran that led to the Tehran Declaration, the negative U.S. reaction was seen as a betrayal, 
which had created significant distrust. As one senior official said, “one of the reasons why 
the Brazilian side is now silent on other crises has to do with this. We will think twice before 
taking risks, as on the last occasion, the result was not positive.” Brazil now views its 
international leadership role as promoting global governance by ensuring economic growth 
and social equality. The Brazilian participants stressed that the U.S. government did not 
realize how serious the Snowden revelations were in Brazil. The political fallout was very 
significant for Brazilian policymakers, especially as many have a residual empathy for Russia 
left over from the Cold War. 
Both sides expressed considerable interest and hope that bilateral relations would improve, 
and suggested that change might come following the October presidential elections in Brazil. 
U.S. participants noted that bilateral relations are improving, and high-level visits were 
resuming. The U.S. administration believes, regardless of who wins the Brazilian presidential 
election, that, “we need to get back to the pre-Snowden period.” 
The following sections summarize seven panel discussions.  
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1. National Interests in Global Security 
The two countries have very different perceptions of both the nature of global security 
problems, and the instruments for managing them. The two sides also have different views 
regarding the importance of non-state actors accessing strategic technologies and of nuclear 
weapons. Brazil has a much more state-centric view of global security, while the United 
States increasingly sees non-state actors, particularly international terrorists, as a major threat. 
Brazil also views global security through a more regional lens, while the United States clearly 
views itself as a global leader. 
Brazil’s vision of global security is based on the assumption that states are the main actors 
on the international stage, and that their activities are and should be governed through 
international norms and institutions, according to Brazilian officials. Brazil’s primary national 
security aim is its independence, both territorially and in foreign and defense policy. As a 
senior defense official put it, “strong, Brazil will be in a position to say NO when it has to 
say NO.” Its constitutionally derived foreign policy principles include equality between states 
and peaceful conflict resolution. These principles guide defense policy. As one senior 
Brazilian defense official commented, it is not enough to base global security on the “idea 
that if we want peace, we have to prepare for war. The Brazilian perspective is that if you 
want peace, you also need to prepare for peace. You need to invest in the institutions that 
will promote peace.” This view of global security privileges states and multilateral rules over 
unilateral action and such sovereignty-intrusive norms as Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
Participants made clear that Brazil wants to be seen as a global player. 
Given its peaceful regional environment, Brazil’s National Defense Strategy is driven by its 
national development goals, and defense is viewed as a means to protect and uphold Brazil’s 
national development. Brazil’s strategic and regional security interests are defined as national, 
South American, and the South Atlantic (or South-South), including the west coast of Africa 
(see Figure 1). Threats to global security are first viewed as stemming from the behavior of 
states, and secondly, from the erosion of multilateral institutions and rules (often resulting 
from state actions). Brazil military supports UN-sanctioned military operations when its 
capacity allows it to, as in the case of the UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti, and the UN 
	   8	  
Interim Force in Lebanon, in which a Brazilian admiral commands the Maritime Task Force 
whose flagship is a Brazilian frigate. 
Brazil views the global strategic environment through the framework on international and 
regional treaties, including the NPT and its commitment to full elimination of nuclear 
weapons, the South Atlantic 
Peace and Cooperation 
Zone (ZOPACAS) and the 
Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR). Brazil’s 
official policy is that 
strengthening South 
American integration and 
relations among Amazonian 
countries reduces the 
possibility of conflict in its 
strategic environment. One 
mechanism to pursue these 
goals is through UNASUR’s South American Defense Council. Participants stressed that this 
Council is not a traditional alliance but a consensus-building mechanism for consolidating 
South America as a zone of peace and democratic stability and creating a South American 
defense identity. Brazilian officials also emphasized the need to make the NPT more 
effective through reform and a greater focus on nuclear disarmament. 
Militarily, Brazil insists on its defensive posture and underlines that its forward-leaning, 
global posture occurs via its diplomacy. Its National Defense Policy highlights the need for 
national autonomy in three strategic technologies: space, cyber, and nuclear. In this context, 
the discussion turned to the nuclear sector, and Brazil’s stated aim to become self-sufficient 
in the operation and maintenance of nuclear submarines. Its objectives are to master the 
nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear propulsion, and the design and construction of a number of 
nuclear submarines. It currently has an agreement with France to develop and deploy one 
Figure	  1.	  	  Brazilian	  Security	  Interests 
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nuclear submarine by 2023. According to senior Brazilian defense officials, these aims are 
purely defensive. Brazil’s primarily military aim can be said to be dissuasion, via the denial of 
sea access, defense of Brazil’s distant sea border, and discouragement of force concentration.  
Brazilian officials emphasized that limited resources resulted in Brazil’s primarily regional 
security focus. However, they stressed that, “Brazil wants to be a global player.” Brazil, they 
said, views global security issues as being mandated by the United Nations, and Brazil invests 
such efforts within its economic means. Geopolitics also come into play, as Brazilian 
participants stated that Brazil recognizes it has more weight in South America and the South 
Atlantic. Much of Brazil’s efforts at the global level do not take place in the realm of 
security, but in those of development and economics.  
In sharp contrast to the largely regional view of security offered by Brazilian defense 
officials, former U.S. defense officials underscored the genuinely global nature of U.S. 
security interests and the centrality of nuclear weapons to them. Nuclear weapons since 
World War II have been “considered essential to U.S. national security to deter nuclear 
attack, assure allies, protect U.S. interests and ensure U.S. superpower status,” according to a 
former senior Obama administration defense official. This continued through the end of the 
Cold War; it was only in 2007-2008 that key national security figures (Henry Kissinger, 
George Schultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn) argued that U.S. military superiority meant 
that the United States would still be secure in a nuclear-free world and the United States 
should reduce and ultimate end reliance on nuclear weapons.  
President Obama embraced this goal when he entered office. According to the panel 
speaker, he pursued it through four mechanisms. The first was “resetting” relations with 
Russia, and ratifying the New START Treaty. Second was to begin dismantling nuclear 
arsenals; progress on these two has halted owing to the very negative turn in U.S.-Russian 
relations. Third, President Obama wanted to strengthen the IAEA, to increase its funding, 
and ensure that it would be very difficult for a North Korean scenario to be replicated. This 
aim has not been achieved. Fourth, the President wanted to secure fissile material so that 
terrorists could not access them. On this count, there has been modest progress in the global 
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nuclear security summits in 2010, 2012, and 2014. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reflects 
this concern in its recognition that the key threat to American security is no longer from the 
major powers, and that the real threat is WMD terrorism.  
Currently, there is a lot of rethinking of these four pillars of nuclear disarmament, because 
some of the ideas now seem naïve. Since President Obama announced the Prague agenda, 
every nuclear country except the United Kingdom and France have increased spending on 
their nuclear arsenals. This suggests that there are major problems ahead with respect to 
disarmament. While nuclear weapons remain key to U.S. national security, preventing 
proliferation is also key, according to a former senior defense official. Missiles have been the 
key to delivery of nuclear weapons and precision-guided conventional weapons. U.S. policy 
with respect to missiles, according to a former senior defense official, is “unquestionably 
hypocritical,” in that the United States focuses on improving our missile technologies but 
preventing their spread to anyone else. The U.S. interest in missiles is primarily on regional 
defense, particularly involving Iran.  Missile technologies will remain a key ongoing 
instrument in U.S. national security. 
It became clear as early as the late 1950s that space was a key domain for intelligence, 
surveillance and possibly warfare. Today, space is a new domain for strategic competition, 
according to a former senior U.S. defense official, with many countries, including Brazil, 
India and Japan, now involved in space for commercial purposes. This participant 
emphasized that the Obama administration had engineered a fundamental shift in U.S. space 
policy—away from a focus on dominance towards a concentration on cooperation. The 
current administration’s space policy emphasizes that space is competitive (in the 
commercial and nation-state senses), congested (with more than 20,000 objects in space now 
orbiting the earth, logistics are much more complicated), and contested (the Chinese are well 
aware that the U.S. depends on full operation of our space capabilities, and have therefore 
developed and tested anti-satellite weapons). This former official underscored, however, that 
these new technologies can be in the hands of individuals and small groups, not just states: 
“government is losing its grip on the control of innovative technologies used for military 
purposes.” 
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2. National Perspectives on Regional Security 
Flowing from the different views on global security, the discussion revealed that both sides 
have very different perceptions of regional threats and modalities for managing them. U.S. 
participants discussed the changing U.S. understanding of regional and global threats after 
the end of the Cold War. Some argued that the Cold War model of strategic stability via 
nuclear deterrence had led to a period of strategic incoherence in the 1990s, based on 
conflicting views on the nature of the strategic environment, and an over-inflation of the 
threat environment. During this period, some argued that the U.S. faced a clash of 
civilizations, others that liberal democracy was leading to the “end of history,” still others 
that we were watching the end of the state in the developing world, and another perspective 
suggested that global integration was occurring through economic globalization. At the same 
time, technological change generated a revolution in military affairs that led many American 
experts to declare that new conventional weapons could be used as a strategic instrument, 
leading to defense strategy being defined in terms of “capabilities-based planning.” This 
debate was replaced after the 9/11 terrorist attacks with a new paradigm, in which “the war 
on terror replaced the war on the red menace.”  
His conclusion is that the United States is still the dominant stabilizing actor globally: “the 
world’s oceans are almost completely free of any major violence. The U.S. Navy has played 
an important role in this.” In response to Brazilian participants’ suggestions that the United 
States no longer had the willingness or capacity to lead, U.S. participants rejected this, 
pointing out that despite the recent financial crisis, the United States remains in a position of 
global primacy, and that the Obama administration, far from withdrawing from world 
politics, was acting from a pragmatic realist perspective, refusing to be drawn into conflicts 
that are not vital security threats. “It seems that from a narrow, realist perspective, the 
United States has the largest stake in the orderly functioning of the international system. We 
need to reinvigorate the institutions that have helped to manage stability. NATO is a classic 
example.” In the view of the U.S. participants, more emphasis needs to be placed on U.S. 
diplomacy in managing international and regional security issues. 
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Brazil, according to Brazilian participants, has long viewed itself as a rising power in a 
multipolar world and wants to increase its autonomy via regional integration. “Brazil wants 
to be perceived as more of a global player,” according to one senior official. Brazilian elites 
perceive that there is a transition underway today toward a more multipolar world that is 
beginning to structure states’ behavior and create a window of opportunity for Brazil play a 
larger role in terms of norm-setting.  
Brazil, according to an Brazilian expert on regional cooperation, has pursued a greater role 
through two paths: operational contributions to peacekeeping and peaceful conflict 
resolution, such as the nuclear deal it and Turkey brokered with Iran; and strengthening the 
United Nations through direct participation in normative debates and opportunities and 
supporting the use of truly regional organizations to settle conflicts. This is a rebuff to 
NATO involvement in “out-of-area” operations. Recent examples of Brazil’s norm-setting 
agenda include the concept of “responsibility while protecting” (RWP) to temper the R2P 
norm, and Brazil’s promotion of Internet governance in the wake of the Snowden affair. 
Brazil is in alignment with Russia and China on some aspects of global governance, such as 
RWP in Syria, and that in peacebuilding, security concerns must be balanced with 
development issues.  
Brazil has a deep concern with recent U.S. and Western interventions, which are seen as 
ineffective and lacking attention to their spillover effects. It was clear from the Brazilian 
participants that they viewed the United States as an eager intervener in regional conflicts, 
despite U.S. participants’ statements that the U.S. is a “reluctant warrior,” and that the 
Obama administration had been dragged into several regional conflicts through the actions 
of its allies. Because of this misperception, Brazilian participants see themselves as on the 
opposite side from the United States on the intervention in Libya, Russian intervention in 
Ukraine, and Israeli actions on Palestinian territory. Brazil “is a former colony and there is 
lingering resentment from [U.S.] intervention during the Cold War” in the form of U.S. 
support for the military dictatorship. As a result, “there is a deep distaste” for the perceived 
tendency of Northern actors to view these conflicts as black or white. Brazilians view post-
Cold War interventions and support for post-communist liberal democratic state-building 
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efforts as counterproductive. Brazil views U.S. behavior as unilateral interventionism that 
contravenes the UN Charter in a heavy-handed and trigger-happy approach, especially since 
the start of the war on terror. Brazil instead advocates that the UN and regional 
organizations play a proactive role in mediating regional conflict; it does not wish for NATO 
to reinvent itself with a strong role in policing non-European conflicts. 
Two challenges, according to Brazilian participants, constrain Brazil’s approach to 
international and regional security. The first is a lack of resources. Operationally, Brazil is 
constrained in its ability to act. This should lead to a greater focus on normative tactics. The 
second challenge is that, in the opinion of a Brazilian expert on regional security, Brazil is 
unrealistic in thinking that regional organizations are able to be the leaders on regional issues, 
because they often lack the capacity, as in the example of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. 
There are also limits to the extent which it is in the interests of a large democracy to follow 
the norm-blocking and norm-setting that is being done by Russia and China. 
Participants debated the efficacy of regional institutions. U.S. participants suggested that 
Mercosur was a failure, while Brazilian participants disagreed, believing that while Mercosur 
had not made progress economically, politically it was an important regional institution. 
Brazilian participants viewed NATO as contributing to unilateral interventions that 
produced negative and destabilizing consequences. In contrast, Brazilians saw ABACC as an 
example of a regional organization that outdid its international counterpart, the IAEA, in 
terms of efficacy. U.S. participants strongly disagreed on the role ABACC had played in 
ending the long-standing Argentine-Brazilian rivalry, stating that Argentina had “collapsed 
from within.” Brazilian participants on the other hand viewed the peaceful end of this rivalry 
and the creation of ABACC as proof of Brazil’s unique soft power in using peaceful means 
to end conflict. As previously, mentioned, UNASUR is viewed as a proto-security 
community. The BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) grouping cooperates on 
concrete economic interests; to date there is little normative consensus among them. 
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3. Domestic Political Interests and Strategic Technologies 
In the discussion of the domestic political context for decision-making regarding strategic 
technologies, three themes appeared. First, policymakers in both countries view their 
countries as exceptional, and as deserving of exceptions from the international rules and 
institutions that they support. Second, mutual support for international rules and institutions 
entails a role in ensuring enforcement. Third, the two countries have fundamentally different 
domestic political interest and expertise in security and foreign policy issues. All three 
significantly shape mutual perceptions in ways that complicate the bilateral relationship. 
A Brazilian defense expert affiliated with its parliament presented the perspective of the 
Brazilian National Congress and population. He reminded the participants of the well-
known aphorism, “Brazil is not for beginners.” Despite being constitutionally established as 
a parliamentary republican system in 1988, Brazil is in fact a presidential-parliamentary 
system, established through the 1993 popular referendum. As a result, the workings of 
Brazilian democracy involve the forty-plus political parties participating in government. The 
Brazilian Congress has a very prominent role in Brazilian politics. This shapes the powers of 
the executive in ways that can slow legislative action. There is no system for the President to 
push through legislation, as there is in the United States. All bills must go through both 
houses of Congress. This includes any international agreement that requires expenditure of 
public funds in order to be implemented and any bill related to the development of the 
defense industry. The political implications are that legislation can easily be halted or 
speeded along, based on the actions of a small number of legislators. In contrast to the U.S. 
Congress, according to the Brazilian expert, the Brazilian Congress and populace have no 
interest in foreign policy issues, except in rare circumstances. The Brazilian Congress, in his 
view, does not understand national defense issues; they are not seen as interesting or 
politically important, unless an issue, such as the Snowden revelations, arises. Brazilian 
society, especially its Congress, needs to be convinced to discuss the topics of strategic 
technologies, such as nuclear, space, and missiles. The civilian-led Ministry of Defense, 
Brazilian officials emphasized, is still a young institution, one that is only fifteen years old, 
and has been evolving during that period. Other Brazilian officials emphasized that Brazil 
has a different political culture, one that does not single out countries that may become 
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threats, and does not divide the world into black or white, but rather into a lot of greys. Its 
emphasis is always on the peaceful resolution of conflicts.  
According to the Brazilian legislative expert, there are insufficient contacts between the two 
countries. There are few U.S. experts on Brazil, while there are many U.S. specialists on 
Russia and China. There is a great need for more Track II dialogues and civil society 
interchanges. Brazilian society has a love-hate relationship with the United States. Anything 
dealing with the United States, such as the Snowden affair, is blown out of proportion. This 
is not true of events occurring in other countries, only the United States. There are very few 
experts on defense and intelligence issues in Brasilia.  
Brazil, according to this expert, is the only Western BRICS country and the only one that 
shares common values with the United States. Brazil has been a great partner to the United 
States in the past and can be again. This interlocutor stressed, however, that, “Brazil must be 
understood in a relationship with respect and in a cooperative mode. …We must not be seen 
as a younger brother or just another Latin American state, or we will have problems…. We 
should play as equals, and not just as that ‘exotic country’ in South America.” The United 
States should recognize that “we are simply realists. We are not going to compromise our 
relationships with other countries over human rights violations.” Brazil has more common 
interests with Russia than with Ukraine. The human rights issues there are an issue between 
Russia and Ukraine, not a Brazilian concern. The same applies to Syria, according to this 
specialist. “We don’t like Assad, but the Brazilian position is that it’s the best option we have 
now. It’s important for you to know how Brazil works.” Another Brazilian official stressed 
that there has been a gradual political maturation among the Brazilian political elite that has 
produced a fundamental cross-partisan consensus on Brazil’s general path of development, 
one that should lead foreign observers to neither overreact or underestimate Brazil’s 
international position and its steady pursuit of its national development.  
A former U.S. government official provided the U.S. counterpoint on the domestic public 
mindset regarding international security issues. He stressed that the United States “means 
well, has a lot of capacity, but doesn’t always go the right way.” Three factors underpin this 
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mindset in his view. The first is that the U.S. public believes that the United States is 
different and special. It is comfortable with the idea of American exceptionalism, and with 
military intervention because “we’re good people, and we believe it’s in the best interests of 
‘those’ people.” The U.S. public has become much more comfortable with military displays 
in public life over the past twenty years, especially after the 2001 terrorist attacks.  
A second factor is that the U.S. public for two generations had a Cold War mentality that 
accepted that the United States must take a global role as leader of the free world. The public 
now, however, is no longer comfortable with global leadership, and “no longer wants this 
responsibility.” Brazilian participants questioned whether the United States retains a vision 
of the international agenda, suggesting that the United States is today merely responding to a 
series of crises, rather than leading. U.S. participants responded that this was an 
exaggeration. Currently, the United States is drawing down from two wars; it remains 
committed to maintaining an open international economy.  
The third factor is the role that the institutionalization of the military-industrial complex has 
played in U.S. domestic politics. It is deeply ingrained in each state’s economy, and it will 
keep trying to sustain itself. These forces influence nuclear and strategic policy and planning. 
With respect to the U.S. nuclear triad, one participant estimated that the United States will 
need to spend at least $1 trillion to modernize it over the next thirty years. The U.S. Air 
Force controls the bombers and land missiles, while the U.S. Navy is pushing for a new 
generation of nuclear submarines. Despite the sea-leg of the triad being the most stabilizing 
strategically, there is resistance from what is called the ICBM Caucus in the U.S. Congress, 
made up of the congressmen from three states where ICBMs are located. Meanwhile, the 
Defense Department is unable to cut certain systems, such as the F-35, that it does not want. 
This is because of congressional resistance since the F-35 is being built in several states. A 
U.S. participant compared the U.S. F-35 program to the Brazilian nuclear submarine 
program, a comparison a senior Brazilian defense official accepted. A former U.S. official 
argued that very often such domestic political issues impede the practice of empathy in each 
other’s governments. While one side may perceive that the other is “trying to stick it to us,” 
what, in fact, drives decision-making are domestic issues. The more both countries’ policy 
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makers are able to empathize, through understanding the domestic factors shaping 
perceptions and decision-making, the better both will be able to address issues of concern. 
4. Nuclear Technologies and Nonproliferation 
The conversation shifted to assessments of U.S. and Brazilian perspectives on nuclear 
technologies and the international nonproliferation regime. Despite common definitions of 
unconventional technologies, it is unclear whether there is room for significant cooperation 
between the two countries on nonproliferation. One of the most promising areas may be on 
the issue of nuclear safeguards. 
 While the United States and Brazil define strategic weapons in the same way, they have 
different positions on the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and on nuclear 
terrorism. The United States’ official policy is to deny anyone access to unconventional 
weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missile technologies. There has been a significant shift 
in U.S. focus to preventing non-state actors from acquiring nuclear materials. In practice, 
according to one U.S. expert, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the top U.S. priority, 
with missile proliferation the lowest. There have been noticeable exceptions to official U.S. 
policy to promote nonproliferation, in particular: removal of sanctions against Pakistan for 
its nuclear programs after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, the U.S. 
agreement to allow the Republic of Korea to extend the range of its missiles, and Israel’s 
nuclear program. The U.S. expert argued that these exceptions were driven primarily by 
geopolitical concerns, but economic and domestic political interests also played a role.  
In general, according to this participant, three considerations drive U.S. policy on strategic 
technologies. First among them are realist concerns. These drive the United States to limit 
the size of the nuclear club of nations in order to preserve its status and influence over its 
allies; in addition, the United States holds onto nuclear weapons because it gave up its 
chemical and biological weapons programs. Genuine security concerns regarding rogue 
states and transnational terrorist organizations prompt the United States to retain nuclear 
weapons, as does the desire to protect its conventional forces. The second set of 
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considerations stem from the United States’ tradition of supporting liberal internationalism 
in the form of international organizations and nonproliferation agreements. The United 
States has traditionally desired to create and build up international norms and multilateral 
institutions; this tradition is being threatened by a domestic political division over the 
benefits of international laws.  The third driver of U.S. policy is less important, but it is the 
desire to avoid nuclear war and prevent the use of chemical and biological weapons. It is an 
aspirational goal that repeats itself in U.S. history and prompts the United States to seek 
arms control treaties and to engage with nuclear powers in South Asia, as well as to 
episodically favor disarmament. There is a sense in the United States that the multilateral 
treaty process may be dead. As a result, there has been a proliferation of nonproliferation 
arrangements (such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, MTCR, Global 
Partnership, Proliferation Security Initiative, Nuclear Security Summits, and UNSCR 1540) 
that do not go through the full treaty institutionalization process. These seek to enforce the 
NPT regime, rather than broaden it to more countries. As a result, this U.S. expert did not 
foresee much scope for deeper cooperation between the United States and Brazil on 
nonproliferation. Some future options for collaboration might include bringing Brazil into 
the Global Partnership as a donor, building on the experiences of regional organizations, and 
joint studies of how to make nuclear disarmament feasible.  
On the Brazilian side, a Brazilian expert argued that, while there is plenty of hypocrisy in the 
U.S. position on nonproliferation and disarmament, Brazil itself is not blameless in this 
regard. In particular, he argued, Brazil needs to provide a better rationale for its positions on 
three issues: the Additional Protocol of the NPT; Article 6 of the NPT; and its pursuit of 
nuclear submarines. This discussion produced an intense debate among the Brazilian 
participants. 
With respect to the Additional Protocol, which Brazil has not signed, the expert stated that 
Brazil resents the pressure to sign it, the implication that it must do so in order to be viewed 
as a responsible nonproliferator, and comparisons with other non-signatory states, such as 
North Korea and Syria. Brazil views itself not only as a responsible nonproliferator, but as 
the co-architect of a regional nuclear agreement with Argentina and the Four-Party 
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Agreement among Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA and the United Nations, that are superior to 
the Additional Protocol. It furthermore feels that these achievements have not been given 
due recognition. Brazil also believes that adherence to the Additional Protocol might 
compromise its accomplishments with Argentina. According to this expert, this has become 
a fairly rigid position, one reinforced by the perception that Brazil is being dictated to and 
“treated as a child.” The problem is that Brazil’s position also affects the IAEA’s relationship 
with Argentina, which would like to sign the Additional Protocol. This expert suggested that 
a solution may require a novel approach, perhaps in the form of a different institutional 
mechanism, in order to move forward. Such an arrangement might involve an amendment 
of the Four-Party Agreement or creating a different instrument that deals with the 
uncovered issues. According to Brazilian participants, such movement would require waiting 
until after the 2014 presidential elections.   
The second issue on which Brazil needs a better rationale, according to the Brazilian defense 
expert, is serious progress on Article 6 of the NPT. Serious progress, in his view, requires 
addressing both the four nuclear weapons states (NWS) that are not party to the NPT, as 
well as the Article 6 obligations of NPT nuclear weapons states (the United States, Russia, 
China, France, and Great Britain) to make progress on disarmament. Brazil’s attitude has 
been that the NPT NWS must disarm. Yet, Brazil’s position is inconsistent, in this expert’s 
view, as it does not ask the same of the non-NPT NWS. Brazil has been particularly irritated 
by the special treatment India received (in the form of the U.S.-India nuclear deal), yet it has 
not focused equally on India and the United States in terms of criticism. Furthermore, many 
of the problems of implementing the thirteen steps outlined in the 2000 Nuclear Review 
Conference Final Document are associated with Russian and Chinese actions, not the United 
States. Step 7 of the Final Document (requiring ratification and implementation of START 
II and START III) “is dead,” according to this Brazilian expert. More ambitious progress on 
the thirteen steps requires engaging the NWS, particularly Russia and China. This expert 
recommended that a new venue or instrument that brings together the United States, Brazil, 
Sweden and perhaps the other BRICS countries be created to revise the thirteen steps and 
refocus issues to account for non-NPT NWS. 
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The third issue on which the Brazilian defense expert argued that Brazil needed a more 
convincing argument is that of nuclear submarines. This expert argued that Brazil not only 
lacked a compelling rationale for such submarines, but that the cost accounting for the 
program was nontransparent. This led to a debate among the Brazilian participants regarding 
the nuclear submarine program, as well as Brazil’s desire for nuclear energy independence. 
The discussion revealed that there is little public knowledge of the Brazilian nuclear 
propulsion program, nor is there clarity on the full costs or rationale for the program. On 
one side, arguments were based on presumed cost advantages of a nuclear submarine 
program over air-independent propulsion subs, as well as Brazilian desire for independence 
in the production of nuclear fuel. A representative statement on this side of the debate, was 
that “a nuclear submarine is important for our national defense. If we want to be 
constructive, when it comes to U.S.-Brazil cooperation, it is important to accept this reality.” 
On the other side were arguments that the rationale for nuclear submarines did not 
correspond with the predictable costs associated with building, operating, and maintaining 
such a fleet, as well as the decommissioning and disposal costs of nuclear waste generated. A 
Brazilian academic challenged the officials present to provide a detailed cost calculation and 
strategic rationale for the program versus other systems: “There is a lack of transparency, not 
because of bad will, but because procedures are not clear or established, particularly in terms 
of how this accounting has been made…. It is important, because if the rationale doesn’t 
make sense, people will try to identify other explanations, and those explanations might not 
be benign.” In conclusion, a senior Brazilian defense official stated that nuclear submarines 
“will place the defensive navy at a different level. If we wanted power projection, we would 
have aircraft carriers. But [nuclear submarines] are a Brazilian Navy decision, and the Navy 
won’t stop them, unless there is some political decision to change.” The official “wants to go 
forward to make sure that the United States doesn’t see this as a threat.” 
5. The United Nations, IAEA, and Safeguards 
Regarding the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, it became clear that national 
exceptionalism and the two countries’ different views regarding non-state actors shape both 
countries views of the effectiveness of the regime and its implementation. Despite 
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disagreement regarding the efficacy of the NPT, both sides did agree that new safeguard 
arrangements are necessary given changing technologies.  
A U.S. specialist on nuclear security spoke on U.S. perspectives regarding nonproliferation 
and disarmament, peaceful development of nuclear energy, and the nuclear safeguards 
regime. He presented the national, bilateral, multilateral and international tools for managing 
nonproliferation and disarmament. At the national and bilateral level, the U.S. toolbox 
includes: sanctions, security assurances, security assistance, 123 agreements (under section 
123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act) for peaceful nuclear cooperation, WMD and counter-
terrorism defense, and the use of force.  With respect to the peaceful development of 
nuclear energy, bilateral cooperation in this sphere most commonly takes the form of 123 
agreements, while at the international level, the United States focuses heavily on the IAEA. 
It provides twenty-five percent of the IAEA’s regular budget, while Brazil contributes one 
and a half percent, according to this specialist. The United States also gives half of the funds 
making up the IAEA Voluntary Fund. 
The United States under President Obama has been a strong supporter of the IAEA and the 
safeguards regime, according to the U.S. expert. This is a change in policy from the Bush 
Administration. The United States, unlike other NWS, has voluntarily placed its own nuclear 
civilian materials under safeguards. The United States also favors continuous improvements 
in the nuclear safeguards regime. With respect to Brazil and nuclear safeguards, this specialist 
argued that the Quadripartite Agreement that Brazil is party to is “good but old. Safeguards 
are evolving.” He suggested that while Brazil rhetorically supports global institutions, it 
“defects to ‘regional’ ones when it’s convenient.” He urged his Brazilian counterparts to 
reconsider its objections to the Additional Protocol (AP). Argentina does not object to the 
AP, so this is a Brazilian issue, not a regional one. As the U.S. expert put it, “global 
governance requires compromise by individual states. The International community 
overwhelmingly supports the AP.” A Brazilian former official disputed that Argentina wants 
to join the AP, and said that in Brazil, it is the national Congress that objects to the AP. 
While Brazil is not presently the object of U.S. nonproliferation attention, according to the 
U.S. expert, it is in the minority with Russia and a handful of other countries that oppose the 
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AP. The current, generally pro-Brazilian view held by Americans may change, according to 
this expert, and it is important to negotiate now before views harden over this issue. 
The Brazilian perspective on regional safeguards and nonproliferation was presented by a 
former high-level official. In his view, bilateral and regional initiatives are the most effective 
means for achieving nonproliferation and disarmament. He argued that nonproliferation 
requires attention both to motivations and barriers; too much attention to barring 
proliferation may in some circumstances increase a country’s motivation to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Lack of trust among neighbors is a key factor promoting proliferation. He pointed 
out that overcoming that lack of trust was important in the creation of ABACC and the 
resolution of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry, as well as in the South African case. In his view, 
“we don’t see proliferation as something that Brazil can do much about. We think that the 
ball is in the U.S.’ court, not in Brazil’s court,” as most disarmament has been bilateral. Brazil 
intends to develop peaceful nuclear power and nuclear propulsion. Brazil, in contrast to the 
rest of the ten largest economies, does not need nuclear weapons owing to its peaceful 
regional environment; however, he suggested that Brazil alone among these countries did 
not have complete control over nuclear weapons and the nuclear fuel cycle or access to 
weapons-usable nuclear material. On this point, he was challenged by U.S. participants, who 
rejected his claim that Germany and Italy “shared” control of nuclear weapons with the 
United States, rather than being under a U.S. nuclear umbrella. No U.S. ally can launch a 
U.S. nuclear weapon. The Brazilian former nuclear official said a similar list could be drawn 
up with respect to nuclear submarines, on which “only the vanquished countries in the 
Second World War do not have nuclear submarines.” Brazil, he stated has a right to pursue 
nuclear submarines and nuclear fuel cycle technology, as these pursuits are perfectly legal 
under the NPT. With respect to the AP, the former official said that Brazil would not sign 
the AP in the short-term future, but it would apply special safeguards. On the issue of 
safeguards, the former official was in agreement with the U.S. specialist that safeguards are 
evolving. In the former official’s view, ABACC’s safeguards need to be improved to assure 
that non-declared nuclear materials are covered, in a non-intrusive manner. He suggested 
several methodologies for improving ABACC safeguards: the development of environmental 
sampling methods; application of safeguards on nuclear submarine fuel; and other non-
intrusive methods.  
	   23	  
The presentations produced a debate about the rationale for comparing Brazil with other 
countries that have a latent nuclear-weapons capacity, owing to their knowledge of the 
enrichment process, and Brazil’s opposition to the AP. This debate revealed deep differences 
in the way U.S. and Brazilian participants view the global nonproliferation regime’s efficacy 
and legitimacy. On the U.S. side, participants reiterated that, while Brazil is not currently 
associated with nuclear technology or weapons by most in the United States, there are 
people who will compare Brazil to other countries such as Iran, Japan and South Korea, that 
have enrichment capacity. Brazil’s capacity “will create a suspicion where one does not have 
to exist,” in the words of one U.S. former official. “Most Americans,” he continued, “don’t 
appreciate the sovereignty imperative” in Brazil and other post-colonial countries; to foster a 
broader-based cooperative relationship with the United States, he argued, “we need a strong 
compelling voice like Brazil’s in the nonproliferation treaty process. You are increasingly part 
of the problem by trying to be distinct.” Another U.S. expert stated that “you can’t blame 
others who make this accusation, because there is a list of countries that won’t sign the 
Additional Protocol, and you are on the list.” One U.S. participant highlighted that the U.S. 
government was structured in ways that enhance this viewpoint, as there are functional and 
regional bureaus in the U.S. executive branch; in the regional bureaus, officials will have a 
comprehensive view of Brazil, but in the functional agencies, “you care about the 
international architecture and who is a friend or ally in supporting that architecture and who 
is an outlier.”  
Brazilian participants responded that Brazil is prohibited by its 1988 constitution from 
pursuing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy. “There isn’t a single member of the Brazilian 
parliament that will defend WMD… This should differentiate us from countries such as 
Pakistan and India.” Brazilian participants were emphatic in the face of some U.S. 
participants’ concerns that the constitution could be changed or misinterpreted, asserting 
that the 1988 Constitutional ban on nuclear weapons was permanent; they argued that the 
consensus that led to this ban was the only item of the 1988 constitution that had complete 
unanimity at the time. U.S. participants suggested that, “the purpose of the international 
regime is to try and avoid these kinds of arguments about “we are different so we should 
have an exception. Brazil has had seven constitutions….” Some Brazilian participants 
suggested that it was alright for Brazil to be an exception in terms of adhering to the AP. 
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Other Brazilians disagreed that Brazil was asking for an exception, but rather that Brazil 
viewed the NPT and AP differently—not as an architecture into which states should to be 
forced; rather states should be viewed as members of a global community who need to be 
persuaded that a regime is fair. Brazil’s position is that “we have to treat states equally. This 
is not the reality of the NPT.” In this Brazilian defense official’s view, it is a mistake to “deal 
with Brazil thinking not in terms of improving the global governance system, but in terms of 
just one more actor that needs to fit into the global architecture that has been designed by 
the United States and the other global WMD owners, a framework that has been proven not 
to function to inhibit proliferation.” In this view, the nonproliferation treaty not only does 
not work to stop proliferation, it “has no legitimacy and is not perceived to be fair,” and it 
should be replaced by a more horizontal treaty, along the lines of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).  
A U.S. expert rejected this claim, stating that the NPT “is arguably the most effective 
national security treaty in the world. The rate of proliferation has declined in every decade 
since the 1990s. No treaty has been more effective. We have a strong correlation between 
the number of inspectors and reductions in proliferation.” In the U.S. view, if Brazil wants 
to join the global community, Brazil should join the AP. Another U.S. participant argued 
that, from the U.S. perspective, it was most concerned about nonstate actors and nuclear 
weapons. U.S. concerns about nuclear latency, therefore, are not just about a state going 
nuclear, but just having the capabilities that could get into the hands of nonstate actors. “The 
analogy most appropriate for Brazil is Japan. … It’s not that we think you are a rogue state, 
we are concerned when our friends and allies have technologies that could destabilize the 
region or get into the wrong hands.” Brazilians responded that most Brazilians view the 
pressure on Brazil to join the AP through an economic lens, as a U.S. effort to restrict the 
market for nuclear fuel; the BRICS are discussing nuclear energy cooperation, primarily for 
market reasons. In response, Brazilian participants accepted that Brazil maintains a state-
centered view of international security and global governance, and that its policy has not 
given as much attention to nonstate actors as it should.  
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6. Space and Missile Technologies 
There are improved prospects for U.S.-Brazilian cooperation in space, according to 
participants. The fundamental shift in the nature of U.S. space policy from dominance to 
collaboration has shifted the U.S. position to be more in alignment with Brazil’s view. 
Brazilian foreign policy, in the opinion of a senior Brazilian defense official, attempts to 
strengthen global institutions on the one hand, but owing to limited financial capacity, Brazil 
believes that maintaining regional stability is one of the signature contributions it can make 
to international security. Brazilian space policy must be viewed in the broader context of 
Brazil’s transition to civilian control of the military and the unification of the military 
branches under centralized civilian control. The second factor affecting Brazil’s space policy 
is the relationship between security and promotion of national development. The three 
strategic technologies highlighted in Brazil’s National Security Strategy—nuclear, space and 
cyber—are viewed as tools to help Brazil acquire as much autonomy as possible.  
With respect to the space sector, the central idea motivating Brazil’s policy is the monitoring 
and control of territory. This focus is seen as a means of promoting interoperability of 
Brazil’s military forces, which prior to the transition to civilian control each held disparate 
threat perceptions. An example is SISFRON, a space-based reconnaissance system in which 
the technology will be used to integrate military capabilities on the ground, enhancing 
information-collection and mobility of the armed forces of Brazil and its neighbors. This 
system should be ready by 2020. Formal treaties with Brazil’s neighbors will establish the 
usage and sharing of this system, which in some cases allow for hot pursuit of fighters across 
borders. Another example of Brazil’s approach to promoting cooperation in space is the 
China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program, Brazil’s space-based collaboration 
with the Chinese government, primarily on environmental monitoring.  
With respect to global governance and bilateral relations, the defense official made the 
following points. For Brazil, space technology is viewed as the key to integrating Brazil’s 
military forces; this is deeply linked with its cyber programs. Brazil is deeply concerned about 
the possible weaponization of space, and views this as an “unbearable” outcome. China’s 
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anti-satellite test “raised eyebrows” in Brazil, as a cause of considerable concern, and was 
seen as a “message to the United States.” Brazil wants to create a set of rules to prevent the 
weaponization of space. The sense of urgency surrounding this issue is increased owing to 
the risks arising for peaceful uses of space from orbital crowding and debris. According to 
the Brazilian defense official, there is a great deal of room for bilateral cooperation with the 
United States on space issues. 
From the U.S. side, an expert on space issues agreed that there are improved prospects for 
bilateral cooperation on space issues. In his view, the most important problem with respect 
to space is that of limited governance. Some of the most significant governance challenges in 
space are crowding, military space activities, and the lack of any comprehensive arms 
control. Nationalistic policies are not solutions for these 21st century space challenges; 
instead, countries are going to need to learn how to cooperate. There is an urgent need to 
develop space situational awareness and the systems that support that information in order 
to reduce the chances of collisions. This expert noted the long history of U.S.-Brazilian 
cooperation on space technologies. These date back to 1958, with cooperation in space 
tracking, followed by U.S. launches from Brazilian facilities in the 1960s and in the 1990s. In 
1996, the U.S. and Brazil signed a landmark agreement for International Space Station (ISS) 
cooperation and astronaut training; this amounted to a $125 million Brazilian contribution to 
the ISS, and a Brazilian air force officer was selected for U.S. astronaut training in 1998.   
Brazil, however, failed to meet its commitments to NASA regarding the ISS agreement 
owing to budget difficulties. Brazil instead turned to Russia, which soured the relationship 
with NASA. Earlier problems have also led to misperceptions in the U.S.-Brazilian space 
relationship. Brazil did not join the 1987 MCTR until 1995, and cooperated on nuclear and 
missile technologies with Syria, Iraq, and others. Brazil has also decided as part of its South-
South cooperation strategy to develop the CBERS program, which is now seeking to launch 
its fourth satellite, after the failed launch of the third. Despite these problems, however, the 
expert stated that relations between the United States and Brazil on space issues have 
generally improved since President Rousseff entered office, the Snowden scandal 
notwithstanding. Brazil has a positive image in the United States, particularly after the 
	   27	  
successful 2014 World Cup and there is growing recognition in both countries that they have 
common interests as major powers. A recent change in U.S. export controls should make 
bilateral cooperation easier. There is good potential for military-military cooperation in the 
space field, and the two sides are examining ways of improving and expanding military ties.  
Space can contribute to improved cooperation in a number of ways. The U.S. government 
has extended its cooperation with the ISS until 2024, which may provide an opportunity to 
resume cooperation with Brazil. More fundamentally, the U.S. government has changed its 
position on international space policy to be strongly supportive of international cooperation, 
according to this expert. This change is reflected in the 2010 National Space Policy and the 
2011 National Security Space Strategy. The 2010 National Space Policy marks a signification 
shift from former U.S. policies, which during the Bush Administration had focused on 
efforts to overcome U.S. vulnerabilities in space and obtain dominance. President Obama, in 
contrast, recognizes space in the twenty-first century in the context of the evolving 
multipolar environment, one in which he believes the United States must begin to set a 
positive example and seek partnerships to promote safety and protect U.S. space assets. U.S. 
intelligence agencies and the military are seeking means to implement the guidelines for 
cooperation in the 2011 National Security Space Strategy regarding crowding, interference, 
and stability-enhancing measures.  
The core notions in President Obama’s space policy, according to this expert, are openness, 
partnership, and prevention of interference with satellites. The new U.S. focus is on space 
commerce and public-private partnerships, and there are prospects for U.S. commercial 
satellite launches from the Brazilian Alcantara site. With respect to security, the Obama 
Administration emphasizes space situational awareness, transparency, and responsible 
behavior. The latter is particularly of concern with respect to Chinese counter-space 
activities and anti-satellite weapons testing. The United States has done considerable 
outreach in terms of building situational awareness in space for partners; with respect to 
Brazil, such cooperation includes the Snap-3 satellite program, a low-Earth orbit program 
that will provide mobile communications to teams in the field, for example in the Amazon, 
that have difficulty accessing traditional communications. 
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There are differences in the U.S. and Brazilian philosophies regarding space initiatives of the 
major powers, as the experts noted. Brazil, but not the United States, supports the draft 
Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use 
of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), proposed in 2008 by Russia and China. The 
U.S. concern is that the draft treaty does not ban the testing of anti-satellite weapons or 
provide any verification mechanisms. The U.S., but not Brazil, supports the European-
initiated 2012 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Brazil has not been 
favorable toward the Code of Conduct; it views the voluntary, as opposed to legally binding, 
approach as fundamentally flawed. A Brazilian defense official reinforced this point, stating 
that “it is better to have a treaty that is unfair than to have no treaty at all.” U.S. participants 
highlighted that the U.S. Senate is not willing to ratify a binding agreement, which is why the 
executive branch supports the voluntary approach.  
Given that there was support from both Brazil and the United States for the 2012-13 UN 
Group of Government Experts on Space Transparency and Confidence Building Measures 
and the ongoing work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS), there is a good opportunity for mutual cooperation, particularly on 
sustainability issues. The two sides agreed that they need to understand each other better 
when it comes to space security, and that there is room for progress. The United States 
recognizes that isolation on space issues does not serve its interests, and the recent National 
Space Policy represents this shift. It is much more aligned with Brazil’s space policy than 
prior U.S. space policies. Brazil, U.S. participants believe, must make some choices about 
which countries to partner with in space. 
7. Deepening U.S.-Brazilian and Civil Society Engagement 
The dialogue closed with a discussion of what can be done to expand understanding and 
cooperation between Brazil and the United States on strategic technologies, nonproliferation 
and disarmament, both at the government and civil society levels. Participants from Brazilian 
and U.S. civil society organizations emphasized a common theme of the dialogue: that the 
values—including democracy and human rights— shared among civil society in Brazil and 
	   29	  
the United States run deep, and are not simply rhetoric. The two are “very natural partners,” 
in the words of a Brazilian civil society representative. Brazilian participants emphasized 
throughout the meeting that the United States is admired in Brazil, even while it is criticized. 
Similarly, U.S. participants noted that U.S. perceptions of Brazil are positive. A Brazilian 
participant noted that in researching bilateral relations for a Brazil-U.S. task force, the same 
issues have been on the agenda from the 1980s to today: energy, defense, narco-trafficking 
and multilateral goals. On these goals, both sides believe they should and could cooperate, 
and in his view, civil society should be the predominant actor.  It is the only actor that 
continues to operate when official relations are frozen, as they were during the Carter 
Administration and again more recently. The key impediments to increased civil society 
engagement have been lack of expertise, and lack of contact and awareness. 
A central obstacle to deeper mutual understanding and engagement is lack of expertise and 
extensive contacts on both sides regarding the other. One cause is that Brazilian civil society 
is much less developed in the areas of security studies and expertise. While there have been 
extensive connections between U.S. and Brazilian NGOs on environmental and indigenous 
rights issues, there has been much less contact on foreign policy and security issues. Brazilian 
participants stressed that the discipline of international relations (and think tanks devoted to 
them) is still a very young enterprise in Brazil, and that it is only in the past fifteen years that 
international relations departments have been established at universities and think tanks 
devoted to international relations have developed. This has meant that there have not been 
Brazilian counterparts in terms of foreign affairs think tanks until recently.  
Another issue is the comparatively small number of NGOs in Brazil relative to the other 
BRICS countries. Most of the civil society engagement that has occurred has been 
commercial, with chambers of commerce facilitating interaction. It was noted that the only 
issues that the U.S. Congressional Brazil Caucus works on are trade issues, not those related 
to security or foreign policy. Both countries lack experts who focus on U.S.-Brazil relations. 
What expertise does exist in Brazil is disconnected from policy elites in Brasilia and foreign 
policy think tanks, which are generally located in Rio de Janeiro or Saõ Paulo. A U.S. 
participant from a Washington think tank stated that this extends to the official level, as the 
	   30	  
Brazilian embassy does not do much outreach in Washington, nor does Brazil have a 
lobbyist in Washington as most governments do.  
The second impediment to improved relations is the dearth of mutual awareness between 
Brazilian and U.S. societies. Participants highlighted the singularity of Brazil as a Portuguese-
speaking country in the Western Hemisphere. It is overwhelmed by far greater numbers of 
Spanish-speaking residents, given the relatively tiny Brazilian expatriate community in the 
United States. This is an artifact of the fact that Brazil is the least mobile country in the 
world, according to one participant. As one Brazilian participant explained, Brazilians are 
inward looking and there is a Brazilian aphorism that “If you are a Brazilian living abroad, 
you will suffer in your soul.” Few in Brazil speak foreign languages, while few in the United 
States know Portuguese. This hinders scholarly and other exchanges, though all participants 
welcomed the success of President Rousseff’s “Science Without Borders” program. There 
are even structural difficulties within Brazil for Brazilians educated abroad to have their 
degrees recognized domestically, and to the publication and presentation of theses in English 
or Spanish. There is also a legacy of anti-Northern and anti-U.S. sentiment in Brazilian 
universities left over from the Cold War. Given the Brazilian government’s focus on South-
South relations, it is far easier for foreign affairs researchers to find grants for research on 
Africa than on the United States. On the U.S. side, Brazil tends to subsumed under the 
category of Latin America. As a result, few U.S. think tanks or universities have specialists or 
centers on Brazil that distinguish it from among the Spanish-speaking countries in the 
hemisphere. Even in the recent spate of university initiatives on the BRICS, there are far 
more U.S. experts on Russia, China, South Africa, and India than on Brazil.  
Despite these obstacles, participants agreed that the United States and Brazil are “natural 
partners across all the functional areas.” They suggested a number of ways to increase and 
maintain a community of expertise on U.S.-Brazilian relations in both countries. Both sides 
endorsed continuation of Track II dialogues such as this one. Other ideas included a joint 
program on improving nuclear safeguards and on what each country would like to see on 
each other’s nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. U.S. participants suggested working 
with the Brazilian Caucus in the U.S. Congress to improve its awareness of the depth and 
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breadth of security issues on the bilateral agenda and to work with U.S. foundations on 
promoting bilateral engagements on nuclear and strategic technology issues. Participants all 
agreed that the number of exchanges among research institutes, think tanks, and other civil 
society organizations should be increased. The U.S. government could seek to work with 
Brazil when working with the United Nations on peacekeeping, and in the Caribbean, where 
Brazil has established a very strong diplomatic presence. The United States might undertake 
cyber security training in Brazil, in particular for youth, as Brazil is home to a very large 
percentage of botnet-infected computers. Brazil needs to strengthen its official presence in 
functional areas such as nonproliferation and trade, and it could continue to use the BRICS 
moniker as a means to increase its profile on these issues. The visa regime between the two 
countries inhibits travel, and could be eased. Brazil, in the view of U.S. participants, should 
recognize that its pursuit of South-South cooperation is not mutually exclusive with 
improved relations with the North, and the United States in particular. “Developing contacts 
in the North could strengthen Brazilian civil society in a way that that Brazil is able to offer 
more to the South,” particularly by strengthening its “soft power” through sustaining an 
attractive development model. The participants concluded with the hope that the dialogue 
would continue in a biannual format, with the next iteration to take place in 2016 in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
	   32	  
List of Acronyms 
ABACC Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Materiais Nucleares 
(Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear 
Materials) 
AP Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards 
BRICS Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa Grouping 
CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
FMCT Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ISS International Space Station 
NPT Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty 
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group 
NWS Nuclear Weapons State 
OAS Organization of American States 
PPWT Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of 
the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects 
R2P Responsibility to Protect 
RWP Responsibility While Protecting 
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime 
SISFRON Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de Fronteiras (Integrated Border 
Monitoring System) 
SIVAM Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (Amazon Surveillance System) 
UNASUR/ 
UNASUL 
Unión de Naciones Suramericanas/ União de Nações Sul-Americanas   (Union of 
South American Nations) 
MERCOSUR/ 
MERCOSUL 
Mercado Común del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul (Southern Common 
Market) 
	   33	  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
UN United Nations 
UNCOPUOS United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Space  
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WMDFZME WMD Free Zone in the Middle East 
ZOPACAS Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul (South Atlantic Peace and 
Cooperation Zone) 
 
